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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Mr. Hall filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Third Judicial .District Court of Salt Lake County.

The petition

was dismissed on April 11, 1990. This appeal is from that order.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Section 78-2a-3(f) of the Utah Code Annotated (1990 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did Hall file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus

beyond the applicable statute of limitations?
2.

Are the determinations of the Utah Board of Pardons

subject to judicial review?
3.

Did the parole guidelines used by the Board of Pardons in

determining Hall's parole date violate the ex post

facto

clause

of the federal constitution?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 3
No Bill of Attainder or ex post

facto

Law shall be passed.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-1
(5)

"Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-5
(3) The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons
in cases involving approval or denial of action, of paroles, of
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution,
are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section
5

prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-9
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to
a penal or correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or class A
misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2). The
release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board,
which shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible.
However, a prisonei: may submit his own application, subject to
the rules of the board.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 3, 1982, Mr. Hall was convicted of Aggravated
Burglary, Aggravated Sexual Assault, Aggravated Kidnaping, and
Aggravated Robbery in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County.
Habeas Corpus).

(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of

Each offense is a first degree felony.

Hall was

sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms, not less than five
years and possibly for life, for each offense, and was
subsequently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

(Response to

Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus).
Hall's first hearing before the Board of Pardons occurred on
March 23, 1983.

The Board of Pardons ruled that Hall was not to

be released from prison at that time, and set a shearing date
for March of 1988.
Corpus).

(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas

On January 7, 1985, Hall's case came before the Board

of Pardons on a redetermination.
review of an inmate's file.

A redetermination is a paper

The Board of Pardons decided that

Hall's status was not to change, and maintained the March 1988
6

parole rehearing date.

(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of

Habeas Corpus).
On March 24, 1986, Hall's case again came before the Board of
Pardons for redetermination.

His status was not changed.

(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus).
On October 13, 1987, Hall's case again came before the Board
of Pardons for a redetermination.
changed.

Again, his status was not

(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus).

On January 6, 1989, Hall came before the Board of Pardons on
a rehearing.

The Board determined that he should be released

from the Utah State Prison on parole on September 13, 1994.
(Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).

Hall filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus in March of 1990. On April 11, 1990, the
Honorable Judge John A. Rokich denied Hall's petition. (Minute
Entry).

On July 19, 1990, appellant appealed the denial of his

writ of habeas corpus to the Utah Court of Appeals.

(Notice of

Appeal) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hall claims that the practical effect of new guidelines used
by the Board of Pardons in determining parole dates violates the
ex post

facto

clause.

He claims that under the new guidelines,

he is being incarcerated four years beyond what would have been
prescribed under the old guidelines.
However, the ex post

facto

clause applies to laws, and courts

have held that parole guidelines are not mandatory standards and
7

do not have the force of law.

Additionally, even if the Board of

Pardons' guidelines were laws, they did not add to Hall's
sentence, and therefore did not increase his punishment, which
must happen in order for a law to violate the ex post

facto

clause.
Second, the dismissal of Hall's petition should be upheld
because decisions made by the Board of Pardons are not subject to
judicial review.

When an offender is given an indeterminate

sentence, the Board of Pardons is vested with virtually total
control over determining the length of the offender's
incarceration.

Both state and federal case law support the

assignment of this facet of the correctional process to the Board
of Pardons.
Finally, Hall's petition must be dismissed because it was
filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations.
ARGUMENT
Mr. Hall's petition claims that the application of new
parole guidelines violated the ex post
federal constitution.
facto

facto

clause of the

This claim is insupportable:

the ex

post

clause applies to criminal laws only, and parole guidelines

are not laws.

The guidelines do not aggravate offenses or make

them greater than when they were committed.

Nor do the

guidelines change the quantum of punishment annexed to the crimes
at the time when they were committed.

8

I. MR. HALL'S PETITION WAS UNTIMELY UNDER THE APPLICABLE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS, AND, THEREFORE, ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD
BE UPHELD.
The statute of limitations for a writ of habeas corpus in
Utah is three months.
amended).

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 (1953 as

The Board of Pardons' decisions which Hall challenges

occurred on March 23, 19 83 and January 6, 1989.

His petition was

filed in March of 19 9 0—well after the statute of limitations had
expired.

The dismissal of his petition must be upheld for

failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations.
II. THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION SHOULD BE UPHELD
BECAUSE BOARD OF PARDONS' DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-9(1) (1953 as amended) states:
The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender
committed to a penal or correctional facility which is
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections
for a felony or class A misdemeanor except as otherwise
provided in Subsection (2). The release
of an
offender

shall

be at the Initiative

of the board, which shall

consider each case as the offender becomes eligible.
However, a prisoner may submit his own application,
subject to the rules of the board.
(empha sis added).
When a convicted defendant is given an open-ended sentence at
the Utah State Prison, the Board of Pardons is solely responsible
for determining the length of time that defendant will serve.
This honorable court has held that there are no statutory
limitations on the Board's discretion in granting or denying
parole.

Hatch v. DeLand, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, (Utah Ct. App*

1990).
9

Furthermore, the Board's decisions are not subject to
judicial review-

Utah Code Ann, 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended)

states:
The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons
in cases involving approval or denial of action, of
paroles , of pardons , commutations or terminations of
sentence, orders of restitution, or remission of fines,
forfeitures, and restitution, are not subject
to
judicial
review.
Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining
or enforcement of a civil judgment.
(emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that Utah's
"sentencing system vests almost complete discretion in the Board
of Pardons to determine the period of time that will actually be
served."

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985).

Finally, under Utah's parole statute, a prison term does not
expire until the maximum sentence has run.
§ 77-27-1(5) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Annotated

Mr. Hall acknowledges this in

his brief ("Petitioner realizes that the Board could
theoretically keep him in prison for life.").
The Utah Supreme Court, Utah Court of Appeals, United States
Supreme Court, 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and Utah Federal
District Court have all ruled that an incarcerated person has no
right to be released prior to the expiration of his sentence.
Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) (before a parole date
has been established, an inmate has no constitutional right to be
placed on parole); Hatch v. DeLand, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (no constitutional or
10
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clause.
Zeidman v .
?

Rifai v. United States Parole Commission, 586 F.2d 695 (9th

Cir.

1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977); Ruip v.
United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977).
In Ruip, the Sixth Circuit stated:
[W]hat is involved in this case is . . . an agency's setting
up guidelines for itself to assure the uniform execution of
its business. These guidelines are not law, but guideposts
which assist the Parole Commission . . . in exercising its
discretion. Nor do these guidelines have the characteristics
of law. They are not filed and rigid, but are flexible. The
Commission remains free to make parole decisions outside of
these guidelines.
Ruip, 555 F.2d at 1335.
In Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that parole guidelines are
"procedural guideposts without the characteristics of laws."
Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1553.

The Wallace court also held that even

where the presumptive parole dates are followed in the majority
of cases, failure to rigidly apply those guidelines does not
violate the ex post

facto

clause.

Hall's reliance on Miller v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (1987),
is misplaced.

Miller was a criminal case in which the plaintiff

had in fact been sentenced

to a longer prison term through the

application of new sentencing

guidelines.

Board of Pardons'

decisions are not part of a criminal proceeding.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1982).
revised sentencing

Morrisey v.

Notably, Miller dealt with

guidelines, not revised parole guidelines.

The distinction between sentencing guidelines and parole
guidelines is critical.

The ex post

facto

language, applies only to criminal laws.
12
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critical

to relief under the ex post

facto

clause is the lack of fair

notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was
consummated, not an individual's right to less punishment.
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30, 101 S.Ct. at 965. No ex post

facto

violation occurs if a change in the law does not increase the
punishment, change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate
facts necessary to establish guilt.

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574

(1884) .
A number of U.S. Courts of Appeals have heard cases similar
to Mr. Hall's, and have held that retrospective changes in parole
guidelines do not aggravate the punishment prescribed for a
crime.

See Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980) (Rehnquist,

J., circuit justice; motion for stay); Warren v. United States
Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, denied,
455 U.S. 950; Hayward v. United States Parole Commission, 659
F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982);
Rifai v. United States Parole Commission, 586 F.2d 695 (9th

Cir.

1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977); Ruip v.
United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977).
In Portley, Chief Justice Rehnquist, sitting as a circuit
justice on a re-parole case, held that changes in parole
guidelines do not add punishment retrospectively, since a change
in these guidelines does not affect the maximum or minimum
sentence that a court may impose, the point at which the inmate
becomes eligible for parole, or his mandatory release date on
14
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the application of those guidelines did not violate the ex
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post

clause.
Therefore, the dismissal of Mr. Hall's petition for a writ of

habeas corpus should be upheld.
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